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Ali A. Allawi, author of The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace, spoke at Brown University last Wednesday as part of the Peter Green Lectures on the Modern Middle East. His talk at Brown was moved to a 675 seat lecture hall to accommodate demand. Read an article covering Allawi's lecture from the Providence Journal. The Occupation of Iraq is now available in paperback.

This is a comprehensive account of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, told for the first time by an Iraqi insider. Ali Allawi, former Iraqi Minister of Defense and Finance, writes from the perspective of both principal and observer, shedding new light on the story behind the invasion, the shambolic aftermath and attempts at stabilization, and why events have failed to unfold as planned.

Click here to listen to an interview with Ali A. Allawi on the Yale Press Podcast.

On February 29, 2008, Yale Press author Tom McCarthy appeared on the Leonard Lopate Show (WNYC) to discuss his new book Auto Mania: Cars, Consumers, and the Environment. You can download the segment or listen with the embedded player below. For more information on the segment, or to hear the entire program, click here.

Spanning the automobile’s entire history, this book is the first to relate consumer behavior to the wider environmental impact of cars—from raw materials and manufacturing to use and disposal. It shows that America’s disappointing response to automobile-related environmental issues stems from the interplay of politics, economics, and desire.

Writing for the Middle East Journal, Mark N. Katz favorably reviewed Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez. Professor Katz, an expert on Moscow's foreign policy toward the Middle East, was blown away by the book's compelling argument and unique viewpoint. Here's what he had to say:

I was highly skeptical about these bold claims when I began reading this book. “Moscow made us do it” seemed to be too neat an explanation for Israel’s actions in 1967. Long before reaching the book’s end, though, I became convinced that Ginor and Remez have gotten it right....

I must concur ... with Sir Lawrence Freedman’s judgment that Ginor and Remez have presented such a strong case for their argument that “the onus is now on others to show why they are wrong.”

Read more from his review of Foxbats over Dimona after the jump.

This groundbreaking history shatters many assumptions about the Six-Day War of 1967. New research in Soviet archives and testimonies from participants in the Israeli/Egyptian conflict reveal the extent of the Kremlin’s involvement, plans for the use of nuclear weapons in the Mid-East, and willingness to precipitate a global crisis.

Click here to listen to an interview with Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez on the Yale Press Podcast.

Katz went on to say this of Foxbats over Dimona:

Their argument is based on, among other sources, a careful study of Soviet documents—many of which have only recently come to light—as well as interviews with former Soviet officials and servicemen who participated in the June 1967 events. Since the book’s publication in June 2007, many of these individuals have confirmed in the Russian press what they told Ginor and Remez. One of the authors’ most startling claims — that Soviet pilots flew the USSR’s then most ad-vanced military aircraft (the MiG-25 “Fox-bat”) over Dimona in May 1967 was subsequently confirmed by the chief spokesman for the Russian Air Force. Further, Ginor and Remez’s description of Moscow’s behavior in 1967 is consistent with how it has behaved on other occasions.

Read an excerpt from Foxbats over Dimona, or view the table of contents.

As part of the series "Iraq: What Next for the U.S.?," Terry Gross of NPR's Fresh Air recently talked with Ali A. Allawi. He is author of The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace, which comes out in paperback on February 4, 2008. Their conversation about the future of Iraq can be heard here.

Involved for over thirty years in the politics of Iraq, Ali A. Allawi was a long-time opposition leader against the Baathist regime. In the post-Saddam years he has held important government positions and participated in crucial national decisions and events. In this book, the former Minister of Defense and Finance draws on his unique personal experience, extensive relationships with members of the main political groups and parties in Iraq, and deep understanding of the history and society of his country to answer the baffling questions that persist about its current crises. What really led the United States to invade Iraq, and why have events failed to unfold as planned?

The Occupation of Iraq examines what the United States did and didn’t know at the time of the invasion, the reasons for the confused and contradictory policies that were enacted, and the emergence of the Iraqi political class during the difficult transition process. The book tracks the growth of the insurgency and illuminates the complex relationships among Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds. Bringing the discussion forward to the reconfiguration of political forces in 2006, Allawi provides in these pages the clearest view to date of the modern history of Iraq and the invasion that changed its course in unpredicted ways.

You can also hear Allawi on the Yale Press Podcast by clicking here, or read the table of contents of his book here.

In light of continued media coverage about the U.S.'s relationship with Iran, Trita Parsi's attention-grabbing Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States was reviewed by both Salon and Bloomberg News. Gary Kamiya of Salon calls it "an important new book," addressing a "fundamental misunderstanding of the country" of Iran. Celestine Bohlen of Bloomberg News admires the book for "tackling the complex question of Israel's role in what has become a triangular relationship" between Iran, the U.S., and Israel.

Read an excerpt, view the table of contents, or listen to an interview with the author on the Yale Press Podcast.

Slate and Seattle Times have recently praised In the Company of Crows and Ravens by John M. Marzluff and Tony Angell, released earlier this year in paperback.

This intriguing book examines the often surprising ways that crows and ravens and humans interact. Featuring more than 100 striking illustrations, the book recounts lively stories about crows and ravens throughout history and around the world, and the authors challenge us to reconsider our thinking not only about these compelling birds but also about ourselves.

Slate contributor Tyler Cowen named it as one of "the best books of 2007," calling it "the unheralded science book of the year." He additionally wrote about this "fascinating book" on his blog, Marginal Revolution.

For their holiday gift list, Seattle Times suggests the "terrific" In the Company of Crows and Ravens, citing the numerous honors given to the book, including "rave reviews for this blend of science, art and anthropology" and "a first prize in book illustration and an overall prize for best work in the Victoria and Albert Museum's illustration contest."

Read an excerpt of the book, or view the table of contents.

Michael Makovsky, author of Churchill's Promised Land: Zionism and Statecraft, has been named one of five finalists for this year's Sami Rohr Prize for Jewish Literature. The Jewish Book Council, who administers the award, considers Churchill's Promised Land to be "a book of exceptional literary merit that stimulates an interest in themes of Jewish concern." One of the finalists will receive the $100,000 prize next spring. For more information on the prize, click here.

This book is the first to explore fully the role that Zionism played in the political thought of Winston Churchill. Tracing the development of Churchill’s positions toward Zionism and the Jewish people throughout his long career, Michael Makovsky offers a fresh and balanced insight into one of the twentieth century’s greatest figures.

Michael Makovsky has a Ph.D. in diplomatic history from Harvard and is foreign policy director of the Bipartisan Policy Center, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. He lives in Washington.

Read an excerpt. View the table of contents. Listen to an interview with Michael Makovsky on the Yale Press Podcast.

Amitai Etzioni, author of Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy, was a recent guest blogger for The Huffington Post. The article, called "An Honesty Test for Politicians," begins:

In the course of this campaign season many questions have been raised about the character of the various candidates for public office. We are sure to hear much more about their personal integrity and the veracity of specific claims they make. The test I recommend is simple: It asks whether a person who is seeking to lead us has the courage to come clean with the American people and tell one and all that we must take a bitter medicine--namely, that we must impose a hefty tax on oil. He or she can soften the blow by listing all the good things that would follow from such a tax, but would have to add that we also must give up on our romance with the automobile.

Continue reading "An Honesty Test for Politicians."

Amitai Etzioni is a Professor of International Relations at the George Washington University. Among his books are From Empire to Community, Political Unification Revisited, Winning Without War, and The Common Good. He served as a Senior Aid to the White House and as President of the American Sociological Association. He taught at Columbia, Harvard, and Berkeley. He was listed as one of the top 100 American intellectuals in Richard Posner’s book Public Intellectuals.

If you're looking for the best books of the year or the perfect gifts for the season, Amazon.com, the New York Times, the Washington Post and others have put together some year-end book lists. Yale University Press books have ranked highly on many of those lists, from arts to science to current events. Here is just a sample of some titles that editors and websites have picked.

Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games by Tennent H. Bagley made the Amazon.com Editors' Picks: Top 100 Books, coming in at number 76. Also, YUP titles made strong showings in a number of the editors' category-based Top 10 lists.

• In the Arts and Photography category, the #1 book of the year is The Sculpture of Louise Nevelson, edited by Brooke Kamin Rapaport. In addition, Balenciaga and His Legacy by Myra Walker was #9.
• Janet Malcolm's Two Lives ranked #4 in the Gay and Lesbian category, as well as #5 in Biography.
• In the Current Events category, The Occupation of Iraq by Ali A. Allawi was listed as #9.
• And in the Science category, The Last Human by G. J. Sawyer and Viktor Deak ranked as #8.

See the rest of the Amazon.com Editors' Picks.

Also, the Yale Holiday Sale has been extended. Free shipping is available for all web orders through December 31, 2007, and select titles are 50% off. And don't forget to check out our Holiday Selections.

Trita Parsi, author of Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States, wrote an article for the November 19 issue of The Nation. Parsi's article, "The Iranian Challenge," reassesses American assumptions about Iran, and it has caught the attention of bloggers all across the web, including AlterNet, Iran Coverage, Mahler's Prodigal Son, Dictynna's Net, and Still Hangin' on a Cross & Snarking from Golgotha.

Trita Parsi (Yale Press Podcast) is president, National Iranian American Council, and adjunct professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University SAIS.

Here's Parsi's article, "The Iranian Challenge," that everyone's reading and sharing:

Iran will be the top foreign policy challenge for the United States in the coming years. The Bush Administration's policy (insistence on zero enrichment of uranium, regime change and isolation of Iran) and the policy of the radicals around President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (unlimited civilian nuclear capability, selective inspections and replacing the United States as the region's dominant power) have set the two countries on a collision course. Yet the mere retirement of George W. Bush's neocons or Ahmadinejad's radicals may not be sufficient to avoid the disaster of war.

The ill-informed foreign policy debate on Iran contributes to a paradigm of enmity between the United States and Iran, which limits the foreign policy options of future US administrations to various forms of confrontation while excluding more constructive approaches. These policies of collision are in no small part born of the erroneous assumptions we adopted about Iran back in the days when we could afford to ignore that country. But as America sinks deeper into the Iraqi quicksand, remaining in the dark about the realities of Iran and the actual policies of its decision-makers is no longer an option.

A successful policy on Iran must begin by reassessing some basic assumptions:

1. Iran is ripe for regime change.

Not true. Although the ruling clergy in Iran are very unpopular, they are not going anywhere anytime soon. (A distinction obviously needs to be made here between the electoral survival of the Ahmadinejad government and the survival of the system as a whole.) The Iranian people certainly deserve a better government--one that provides Iran's youthful population with a better economic future and respects human rights--but the current choice Iranians face is not between Islamic tyranny and democratic freedom. It is between chaos and stability. The increased tensions with the United States over the past year have only strengthened the government's hold on power by limiting the space for prodemocracy activists (much as the 9/11 attacks paved the way for the passing of the Patriot Act and the weakening of Americans' civil rights). Whatever we think of the clergy in Tehran, we cannot afford wishful thinking about their imminent departure.

2. Iran is irrational and cannot be deterred.

Not true. Iran's foreign policy behavior is highly problematic for the United States, but a careful study of Iran's actions--not just its rhetoric--reveals systematic, pragmatic and cautious maneuvering toward a set goal: decontainment and the re-emergence of Iran as a pre-eminent power in the Middle East. Iran often conceals its real objectives behind layers of ideological rhetoric, with the aim of confusing potential enemies and making its policies more attractive to the Muslim nations it seeks to lead. At times it even simulates irrationality as an instrument of deterrence, the calculation being that enemies will be more reluctant to attack Iran if Tehran's response can't be predicted and won't follow a straight cost-benefit analysis. (Richard Nixon used the same strategy during the cold war, in what he called the "madman theory"; he sought to deter the Soviets by making them think he was slightly mad and unpredictable.) In reality, the United States--and Israel--have a long history of deterring Iran. During the Lebanon war of 2006, Israel signaled Tehran's leaders that it would retaliate against Iran if Hezbollah struck Tel Aviv with long-distance missiles. Tehran got the message. Despite many promises by Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah to hit Israel if the Jewish state continued the bombardment of Lebanon, Iran prevented Hezbollah from using its long-range missiles. Deterrence worked, and an uncontrollable escalation of the war was avoided.

3. Iran is inherently anti-American.

Not quite. To Iran anti-Americanism is a means, not an end. Iran believes that its size and power position it to play a major role in regional affairs. This aspiration, however, clashes with America's aim of isolating and containing Iran. As long as public opinion in the Middle East remains largely critical of the United States, and as long as Washington continues to seek a regional order based on excluding Iran, Iran will likely play on anti-Americanism to make Washington's policy of exclusion as costly as possible and to rally existing anti-American sentiment around Iranian objectives. But if the strategic environment in the region changes--with a different relationship between Tehran and Washington as a result--the utility of anti-Americanism will fade away.

4. Enrichment equals a nuclear bomb.

Not necessarily. The current nuclear impasse is partly rooted in the questionable assumption that zero enrichment is the only route to avoid an Iranian bomb. While the optimal situation is one in which Iran does not enrich, this goal is no longer possible. But that does not mean that a small-scale Iranian enrichment program is tantamount to a nuclear bomb. According to nuclear experts like Bruno Pellaud, former deputy director general and head of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Department of Safeguards, intrusive inspections is the best tool to ensure that Iran doesn't divert its civilian program into a military one. Yet these inspections can only take place as part of a package deal with Iran that includes some level of enrichment. This makes reassessment of the zero-enrichment objective all the more important.

5. Iran seeks Israel's destruction.

False. As I explain in my book Treacherous Alliance, the Iranian clergy have strong ideological antipathy toward Israel, but ideology is not the primary driving force of Iranian foreign policy. The major shifts in Israeli-Iranian relations, from pragmatic entente in the 1960s and '70s to strategic rivalry in the 1990s, have occurred because of changing strategic--not ideological--realities. Whenever Iran's ideological and strategic imperatives have clashed--as was the case in the 1980s, when the common threat from the Soviet Union and Iraq prompted Iran and Israel to pursue clandestine cooperation--realpolitik has prevailed. Today, Iran's ideological and strategic imperatives largely coincide. Israel is seen as a strategic and an ideological threat, and as a result Tehran has actively confronted Israel. But Iran does not seek Israel's destruction, nor does its attitude toward Israel lack pragmatism. In 2002 Iran signaled that it was prepared to adopt a "Malaysian profile" on Israel in return for an end to Israeli and American efforts to isolate Tehran. Iran would, much like Malaysia, be an Islamic state that would not recognize Israel and would occasionally criticize it but would not directly confront the Jewish state. Iran and Israel would simply recognize each other's spheres of influence and stay out of each other's hair. The message was communicated to Israel through various channels, including a presentation by a senior Iranian military figure at a conference in Europe attended by several Israelis. Ze'ev Schiff, the late military affairs editor of Ha'aretz, told me that the consistency of Tehran's message "made it more clear that this was a policy" and not just empty talk. Though Iran has a new and more radical president today, it is still ruled by the same Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the concept of a "Malaysian profile" still enjoys support in the Iranian National Security Council--President Ahmadinejad's venomous rhetoric notwithstanding.

6. The pressure on Iran is working.

Questionable. Pressure alone will not resolve the Iranian crisis. Iran has been under comprehensive US sanctions since 1995. These sanctions have undoubtedly been effective in hurting the Iranian economy and have made Tehran's pursuit of its foreign policy more costly. But they have not forced Iran to abandon its policies. In fact, after twelve years of sanctions Iran is more powerful and more defiant than ever. Ratcheting up sanctions will be nothing more than a higher dose of a policy already proven to be unsuccessful. The combination of ineffective sanctions and unrealistic demands will get the United States nowhere.

7. Stability in the Middle East can be achieved only through Iran's isolation. Quite the contrary. History teaches us that an Iran that isn't part of the region's security architecture will be more destabilizing than an Iran that has been incorporated into the region's political order. In the aftermath of the first Gulf War, instead of pursuing an inclusive security architecture for the Persian Gulf, Washington opted to sign bilateral defense pacts with the Arab Gulf states while pursuing a new order in the region based on Iran's prolonged isolation. The policy was called "dual containment," the idea being that the United States would advance the Middle East peace process by containing both Iran and Iraq. What Washington failed to recognize was that the policy of exclusion provided Iran with incentives to undermine US efforts. And the weakest link in the American strategy was the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Without successful peacemaking between the Israelis and Palestinians, America's new regional order could not be achieved and Iran would evade prolonged isolation, Tehran calculated. Though Iran wasn't solely responsible for the collapse of the peace process, it did contribute to undermining it by supporting rejectionist Palestinian organizations at a time when the United States was at the height of its power and when Tehran was in a very weak position. Today the tables have turned. Iran is rising and the United States is mired in Iraq. Instead of repeating a policy that failed under the best circumstances, we must recognize that Iran's propensity to act as the spoiler will decline when it is included, not when it's excluded.

Iran poses a complicated challenge to America, but not an irresolvable one. Despite the tremendous distrust between the two countries, history shows that negotiations can work. In 2001 Tehran and Washington worked closely together to defeat the Taliban and install a new government in Afghanistan. Without Iranian help, the new Constitution of Afghanistan would not have been achieved, according to US diplomats involved in the effort.

Similar cooperation, but on a lower scale, took place before the invasion of Iraq. In 2003 Iran sent the United States a comprehensive negotiations package, only to be snubbed by the Bush Administration. Clearly, success in negotiations can never be guaranteed. But neither can failure. We will never know whether we can succeed in negotiating with Iran until we try. And so far, beyond isolated instances, the Administration has not given broad negotiations a fair chance, nor has the United States pursued a policy of inclusion and regional integration. (A policy of sanctions and confrontation, on the other hand, is a proven failure.)

While hawks are presenting a wide array of arguments as to why we shouldn't talk to Iran--including the notion that, given the quagmire in Iraq, the hand of the United States is now much weaker than it was several years ago, as well as the idea that Washington doesn't have anything to offer--only Washington can offer Tehran what it really seeks: decontainment and reintegration in the Middle East. Iran wants a seat at the table and a say as a legitimate player in all regional decision-making. Iran can make it costly for the United States not to recognize it as a regional power, but it cannot gain its seat at the table without American agreement. This is an extremely valuable carrot Washington can offer Tehran in return for momentous changes in Iranian behavior. In fact, unbeknownst to decision-makers in Washington, America holds an ace up its sleeve. But this ace can be used only in the context of real negotiations.

These negotiations cannot be limited to Iraq or to the nuclear issue alone. The problems between the United States and Iran go well beyond these two issues. There is an underlying geopolitical imbalance that must be addressed. The previous order in the region has crumbled as a result of America's defeat of the Taliban and its subsequent failure to establish a coherent order in Iraq. Even if the nuclear issue and the Iraq calamity were to be resolved, the context that has given meaning to these problems to begin with--the collapse of the previous order and the absence of an all-inclusive security arrangement--will remain unresolved. Any agreement with Iran that does not address this fundamental issue is doomed to be short-lived.

Creating a new regional order, in which the carrot of Iranian inclusion is used to secure radically different behavior from Tehran, is neither a concession to Iran nor a capitulation of American (or Israeli) interests. Rather, it is a recognition that stability in the region cannot be achieved and sustained through the current strategy of pursuing an order based on the exclusion of one of the region's most powerful nations. To change Iran's behavior, we must change our own.

Read an excerpt from Parsi's Treacherous Alliance, or view the table of contents.

From San Francisco to Washington D.C., Yale University Press authors are speaking across the country.

According to the Washington Post Literary Calendar, Daniel J. Solove will appear tonight at 6:30 P.M. at the Borders Books in downtown Washington D.C. He's going to discuss and sign copies of his new book, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet. For more information, call 202-466-4999, or click here.

Daniel J. Solove is associate professor, George Washington University Law School, and an internationally known expert in privacy law. He is frequently interviewed and featured in media broadcasts and articles, and he is the author of The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age. He lives in Washington, D.C., and blogs at the popular law blog http://www.concurringopinions.com.

Also in Washington D.C., Politics and Prose will host Janet Malcolm, author of Two Lives: Gertrude and Alice tomorrow at 7 P.M. For more information on this free event, click here.

Janet Malcolm is the author of The Journalist and the Murderer, The Silent Woman: Sylvia Plath and Ted Hughes, and Reading Chekhov, among other books. She writes for The New Yorker and The New York Review of Books and lives in New York City.

Meanwhile, in San Francisco, Trita Parsi, author of Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States, will be speaking to the World Affairs Council of Northern California. Tomorrow at 6 P.M., he will discuss the relations between Israel, Iran, and the United States. Registering online in advance is recommended to assure seating. For more information, or to register online, click here.

Later this week, Parsi will be the keynote speaker at the annual dinner for the North Suburban Peace Initiative in Evanston, IL. The dinner will be on Saturday, November 10th, from 6 to 9 P.M. Reservations can be made today online. For more information, click here.

Trita Parsi is president, National Iranian American Council, and adjunct professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University SAIS. He writes frequently about the Middle East and has appeared on BBC World News, PBS News Hour, CNN, and other news programs. He lives in Washington, D.C.

Rolling Stone interviewed Trita Parsi, author of Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States, for a recent article. The article reports that Vice President Dick Cheney is "angling behind the scenes for yet another unilateral military action, this time aimed at toppling the clerical regime in Iran." Parsi, who is also the president of the Nationarl Iranian American Council, says that "the United States is pursuing policies that make it impossible to succeed." The article was also picked up by Michael Moore's website, MichaelMoore.com. To read the entire article, click here.

Powell's Books featured a review of Treacherous Alliance for the Review-a-Day section of their website. The review, originally printed in the New York Review of Books, can be found here.

Read an excerpt.

View the table of contents.

Episode 9 of the Yale Press Podcast is now available.

In Episode 9, Chris Gondek speaks with (1) Trita Parsi about his behind-the scenes revelations about events in the Middle East, and (2) James Prosek about his passion and devotion to capturing the beauty of fly fishing.

Download it for free here, on iTunes, and everywhere else that podcasts can be found.

Comments are welcome.

Last Friday the Jerusalem Post published an article citing a recent statement made by chief spokesman of Russia's Air Force, Colonel Aleksandr Drobyshevsky, who publicly acknowledged a major historical detail related to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six Days' War).

The detail refers to reconnaissance flights over Israel, specifically one flight by Colonel Aleksandr Bezhevets. The flights over the Israeli compound of Dimona confirms the position two Yale University Press authors present in their recently released book, Foxbats Over Dimona.

In the Jerusalem Post article, co-authors Gideon Remez and Isabella Ginor described this "extraordinary disclosure" as "official confirmation of the book's exhibit A and the source of its title." Details here.

Monday's NY Sun article expanded on this recent development: "...it would be instructive to look at the case made by two journalists-turned-historians, Ms. Ginor and Mr. Remez, who have recently posited one of the most fascinating explanations yet offered on the origins of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war that changed much of modern history.

"According to their new book, "Foxbats Over Dimona" ( Yale University Press), the Six-Day War started because the Soviet Union was concerned about Israel's nascent nuclear program, having initially learned about it from an Israeli Communist Party leader, Moshe Sneh, who might have worked in the service of Mother Russia, or Zionism, or both.

"The 'Foxbats' in the title refer to the then-experimental MiGÂ-25 reconnaissance bombers that, according to the authors' reporting, flew over the secret Israeli compound in Dimona in May 1967, primarily to map out plans for the destruction of Israel's emerging nuclear facility there, which the Soviets planned to demolish under the fog of a war between the Jewish state and its Arab neighbors, a war to be launched at Soviet instigation.

"Confirmation of the authors' contention was first reported in the Jerusalem Post last week, when the chief spokesman for Russia's Air Force, Colonel Aleksandr Drobyshevsky, wrote what sounds a lot like a Russian version of 'The Right Stuff' in official publications. Describing the extraordinary abilities of Russian test pilots, Mr. Drobyshevsky allowed that one decorated hero, Colonel Aleksandr Bezhevets, performed 'unique reconnaissance flights over the territory of Israel in a MiGÂ-25RB aircraft' in 1967."
To read the entire article, click here.

On the heels of this breaking news, Foreign Affairs just released their review of Foxbats Over Dimona, calling the book, "a book that is truly revisionist, challenging what we thought we knew about the origins and conduct of the Six-Day War....The exact role played by the Soviet Union has always been murky. The authors work their way through the murk, meticulously using every snippet of relevant information....By its nature, this is an impossible case to prove, but Ginor and Remez have succeeded to the point where the onus is now on others to show why they are wrong."
Read the full Foreign Affairs review.

From Yale University Press:
Read an excerpt of Foxbats Over Dimona
Browse the table of contents
Listen to the authors' podcast

Episode 8 of the Yale Press Podcast is now available.

In Episode 8, Chris Gondek speaks with (1) Michael Makovsky about Winston Churchill’s views on Zionism, (2) Tennant Bagley about the controversy surrounding a KGB defector in the early 1960s, and (3) Emily Cockayne about urban nuisances people suffered in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries.

Download it for free here, on iTunes, and everywhere else that podcasts can be found.

Comments are welcome.

June 5, 1967 marks the 40th anniversary of the Six Year War, the start of an armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states, Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

Fearing an imminent invasion, Israel launched a preemptive air attack on Egypt in June 1967 and it achieved such staggering devastation that in just six days the war was won and the future of the Middle East was forever changed. But have our assumptions about the genesis of the Six-Day War been misguided? What was the involvement of the Soviet Union? Were the Israelis planning to use nuclear weapons? Were the Soviets?

Foxbats Over Dimona recently released by Yale University Press, is “A fascinating, plausible, and hitherto untold tale,” says Dov S. Zakheim, former U.S. Under Secretary of Defense.

This book provides an account that is startlingly different from all previous histories of the Six-Day War. Award-winning Israeli journalists Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez investigate newly available documents and testimonies from the former Soviet Union, cross-check them extensively against Israeli and Western sources, and arrive at fresh and frightening conclusions. Filled with astonishing new information about this crucial week in history, the book paints a disturbing picture of Cold War aggression, deception, and calculated willingness to precipitate a global crisis.

With the recent release of The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace, Ali Allawi's new publication is getting quite a bit of media attention. In addition to the recent newspaper coverage, Allawi has appeared on venues such as CSPAN's Book TV and The Charlie Rose Show, as well as speaking at the National Press Club. His publicity tour continues throughout this week with a visit with The Daily Show with Jon Stewart tonight at 11 pm. Click here for a listing of current and upcoming author appearances and engagements.

The Associated Press says of Allawi: "The U.S.- and British-educated engineer and financier is the first senior Iraqi official to look back at book length on his country's four-year ordeal. It's an unsparing look at failures both American and Iraqi, an account in which the word 'ignorance' crops up repeatedly. . ."
For full text, click here.

Moises Naim, editor in chief of Foreign Policy magazine, says, "While many books have been written about Iraq's tragedy, Ali Allawi's story offers a unique insider's perspective of the global forces, local passions and diverse personalities that converged to create a situation that will haunt us for decades. An indispensable source of ideas about what happened - and what is likely to happen - in Iraq."

A Washington Post review concludes, "Thankfully, Allawi's book is not simply a polemic. It is a thorough account of the effort to govern and reconstruct Iraq as told by an Iraqi who was deeply involved in the process. . . .The Occupation of Iraq is packed with fascinating details for those who have closely followed America's misadventure in Iraq, and it's a valuable primer for those who haven't. His insider account of the past four years - and his views of what the United States should have done differently - adds a valuable new voice to the ongoing debate about Iraq."
For full text, click here.