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Purdy, Publicity Director

The National Book Award nominees were announced earlier this week. Kudos to all nominees, especially to our friends & compatriots at the nominated University Presses. I am glad to see the great good wisdom of the nominating committee at the NBAs. Congratulations aside, it is tradition here in the OUP publicity dept to host a little friendly contest to see who can pick the most NBA winners. This year I am inviting our blog readers to join the fray and send me your picks.  Details below.

Please note there is a point system in this contest. Correct picks in Fiction and Non-fiction will each receive 1 point each, 2 points for a correct pick in YA literature, and 3 points for a correct pick in the Poetry category. Please, only one submission per person. Send your entry to [email protected].

In the event of a tie, all entrants with the highest score will be placed in a raffle for prizes. Prizes include a copy of Garner’s Modern American Usage (3rd edition), the Oxford American Writer’s Thesaurus, The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, and the Historical Thesaurus of the OED. One prize per player. I reserve the right to disqualify anyone I feel is trying to game this friendly competition. Awards are announced on November 18th. Winners here will be announced on November 20, 2009. Good luck.

FICTION (1 point)
Bonnie Jo Campbell, American Salvage (Wayne State University Press)
Colum McCann, Let the Great World Spin (Random House)
Daniyal Mueenuddin, In Other Rooms, Other Wonders (Norton)
Jayne Anne Phillips, Lark and Termite (Alfred A. Knopf)
Marcel Theroux, Far North (Farrar, Straus and Giroux)

NONFICTION (1 point)
David M. Carroll, Following the Water: A Hydromancer’s Notebook (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt)
Sean B. Carroll, Remarkable Creatures: Epic Adventures in the Search for the Origins of Species (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt)
Greg Grandin, Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford’s Forgotten Jungle City (Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt)
Adrienne Mayor, The Poison King: The Life and Legend of Mithradates, Rome’s Deadliest Enemy (Princeton University Press)
T. J. Stiles, The First Tycoon: The Epic Life of Cornelius Vanderbilt (Alfred A. Knopf)

YOUNG PEOPLE’S LITERATURE (2 points)
Deborah Heiligman, Charles and Emma: The Darwins’ Leap of Faith (Henry Holt)
Phillip Hoose, Claudette Colvin: Twice Toward Justice (Farrar, Straus and Giroux)
David Small, Stitches (W. W. Norton & Co.)
Laini Taylor, Lips Touch: Three Times (Arthur A. Levine Books/Scholastic)
Rita Williams-Garcia, Jumped (HarperTeen/HarperCollins)

POETRY (3 points)
Rae Armantrout, Versed (Wesleyan University Press)
Ann Lauterbach, Or to Begin Again (Viking Penguin)
Carl Phillips, Speak Low (Farrar, Straus and Giroux)
Lyrae Van Clief-Stefanon, Open Interval (University of Pittsburgh Press)
Keith Waldrop, Transcendental Studies: A Trilogy (University of California Press)

Purdy, Publicity Director

Bob Geldof said it best back in 1979 with the hit “I Don’t Like Mondays.” My staff know better than to approach me too early on Mondays. My crankiness can sometimes last well into the afternoon. Yesterday, however, was an exception to the rule. I love it each year when the Nobel Prizes are announced. And yesterday two Oxford authors were recognized by the Nobel committee for their work in Economics. Congratulations go out to Elinor Ostrom, co-author of The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid (OUP, 2005) and Oliver Williamson, author of The Mechanisms of Governance (OUP, 1999), Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, 2nd Edition (OUP, 1995), and The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development (OUP, 1993).

While I have not had the great good pleasure to work with Ostrum and Williamson, there is still a sense of pride in working for the publisher that recognized their genius and contributions to Economics long ago. We might not see too many celebrity authors (thankfully), or New York Times bestsellers (unfortunately) here at OUP, but we do have a long list of authors who are Nobel laureates, Pulitzer recipients, and National Book Award winners (fortunately). And to the sage Nobel Economics committee in Oslo I say, “Thanks for making my Monday a little sweeter. Keep up the good work. I look forward to next year’s recipients.”

It is not everyday you get two Lincoln Prize winners together to ask each other questions, but lucky us, we had that very honor.  Below is a conversation between James M. McPherson, most recently the author of Abraham Lincoln, and Craig L. Symonds, most recently the author of Lincoln and His Admirals: Abraham Lincoln, the U.S. Navy, and the Civil War.

James M. McPherson: We know from John Hay that Lincoln put himself through a cram course of readings in military history and strategy during the fall and winter of 1861-62, mainly so he could deal more intelligently and forcefully with such generals as McClellan, Halleck, and Buell. Did Lincoln do anything comparable to overcome his admission that he knew “little about ships”?

Craig L. Symonds: Not really. A lifelong autodidact, Lincoln focused on learning as much as he could about war in the first months of the conflict, but he saw from the beginning that the land war was far more important than the naval war. While he read all that he could about the theories of war, he did not undertake a similar regimen concerning naval strategy, in part because there were fewer such books. He was fascinated by new weaponry, played a role in getting the Navy to adopt Ericsson’s Monitor, and he consulted both Seward and Bates on the legality of the blockade, but for the most part, he relied on Gideon Welles, and especially the Assistant Navy Secretary, Gustavus Fox, to provide him with whatever professional knowledge or technical information he needed.

McPherson: Historians hold a wide range of opinions about the effectiveness of the blockade and how important a role it played in ultimate Union victory. Where do you stand on this question?

Symonds: I guess it depends on whether the glass is half full or half empty. The blockade was never impervious, and at times seemed quite porous. As many have argued, the South was able to import through the blockade the weapons and supplies it needed to sustain its armies in the field for four years, though it did encounter serious shortages in specific areas such as steam engines, engine parts, and railroad rails. Exports were a different story. Cotton exports plunged from 2.8 million bales in the last year of peace to only 55,000 bales in the first year of war. That undercut the Confederacy’s ability to establish credit overseas, contributed to inflation and civilian unrest at home, and generally undermined the Confederate economy. The loss of southern revenue from cotton exports was greater than the amount the North spent to establish and maintain the blockade. Given that, I think the blockade was worth the investment. If it succeeded in shortening the war by, say, six month, it probably saved many thousands of lives.

McPherson: Along with Gideon Welles and Gustavus Fox, Lincoln was critical of Samuel Francis Du Pont for lack of aggressiveness and pertinacity in the failed attack on the defenses of Charleston on April 7, 1863, and compared Du Pont to McClellan. Was this fair?

Symonds: There are many things in war that are not fair. Du Pont was very likely correct in asserting that Charleston could not be taken by a purely naval attack, as Gideon Welles repeatedly encouraged him to do, and he was effectively fired for demonstrating that his view was correct. Kevin Weddle calls Du Pont “Lincoln’s Tragic Admiral,” a victim of Welles’ determination to protect the reputation of his beloved monitors. But Du Pont’s fall from grace was due not merely to his failure to capture Charleston. It was also due to two other factors: One was that Lincoln had become scarred by his lengthy and frustrating relationship with McClellan during the 1862 campaign, and by 1863 he had began to view Du Pont through a prism defined by that experience. When Du Pont called for reinforcements, or bemoaned the obstacles in front of him, it was McClellans’ voice that Lincoln heard.

The other reason for Du Pont’s fall is that he never fully explained to the President precisely why he objected to a navy-only attack. Instead he only hinted at it by detailing how strong the enemy defenses were and how limited his own forces were. He never clearly laid out an alternative with the kind of strong advocacy that showed his willingness to carry it out. Even then, I think Lincoln would have stood by Du Pont but for Du Pont’s own foolish behavior when he insisted that the Government must publish his official reports (including compromising information about the vulnerabilities of the monitors) in order to counter hostile newspaper articles about him. In the end, Du Pont’s reticence and touchiness were responsible for his tragedy.

McPherson: Did Lincoln show unjustified favoritism toward John A. Dahlgren when he promoted him to rear admiral and gave him command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron even though Dahlgren had limited experience in seagoing command?

Symonds: Dahlgren was unquestionably Lincoln’s favorite admiral. He much appreciated Farragut’s success, but he liked Dahlgren, often went to the Washington Navy Yard to visit with him, and eventually he asked Welles to promote him to admiral, even though Dahlgren had virtually no important sea service. Most of the navy looked upon Lincoln’s decision to promote his friend from commander to Rear Admiral in one step as personal favoritism. It was favoritism, but whether it was unjustified depends on how well Dahlgren performed in command. Though Charleston never fell, Dahlgren was an active and effective commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, and despite suffering poor health that might have ended the career of a less determined man, Dahlgren worked hard and earned the confidence of his officers throughout the long and wasting siege.

McPherson: From 1862 on, Acting Rear Admiral Samuel Phillips Lee wanted to attack the defenses of Wilmington to shut down the port to blockade runners. When the time came in 1864 to carry out the attack, however, Welles, Fox, and Grant convinced Lincoln that Lee was not the man to command it, and replaced him with Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter. Was this treatment of Lee justified?

Symonds: Like Du Pont, Phillips Lee was a competent officer who was at his best managing the multivariate activities of a far-flung squadron. Unlike Du Pont, he never had the chance to prove himself in a major battle and thereby win promotion to the permanent rank of Rear Admiral. Because the authorizing legislation stipulated that promotions to admiral must be won in battle, Lee repeatedly asked Welles for permission to attack Wilmington, North Carolina. Not until 1864 did Welles accede, and when he did he sent Lee off to the backwater of the Mississippi Squadron and brought in the brash David Dixon Porter to carry it out. Lee felt himself a victim of Welles’ favoritism for others. But in this case, it was U. S. Grant as much as Gideon Welles who was responsible. In Grant’s view, Lee had not been sufficiently aggressive during the move up the James River, and he wanted someone else to command of the attack on Wilmington. When Farragut declined the command, Welles gave it to Porter. Lee’s anger at this treatment is understandable, but Welles and Grant had concluded that while Lee was an effective manager, he was not the man for a full-scale attack. In the end, Lee never did get a chance to prove himself in the kind of engagement that might have won him the promotion he sought.

Symonds: George McClellan is clearly a central character in this story. In your view, was Lincoln too patient with Little Mac, not patient enough, or just about right? Would the Lincoln of 1864 have tolerated McClellan as long as the Lincoln of 1862 did?

McPherson: In one sense, he was too patient. McClellan deserved to be fired after his failure to reinforce Pope at Second Bull Run, as a majority of the Cabinet wanted Lincoln to do. But in another sense, Lincoln was absolutely right that only McClellan could reorganize the army and restore its morale, and if the president had fired him then, the army might have broken down. In the end, Lincoln’s timing on removing Mac from command–just after the fall elections in 1862–was just right.

Symonds: What about the so-called political generals: Did Lincoln appoint and tolerate them out of perceived political necessity, or because he believed that some of them, at least, had genuine merit? And, for that matter, did any of them have genuine merit?

McPherson: Lincoln appointed the political generals in order to mobilize their constituencies for the war effort. Northern mobilization for the war in 1861-62 was a from-the-bottom-up process, with important local and state political leaders playing a key part in persuading men to enlist in this all-volunteer army, and political generals were a key part in this process, which increased an army of 16,000 men in April 1861 to an army of 637,000 men in April 1862. And while we are all familiar with the military incompetents among the political generals, some of them were actually pretty good–John Logan and Frank Blair, for example.

Symonds: Why did Lincoln put up with Henry Halleck?

McPherson: Lincoln used Halleck to translate presidential orders and wishes into language that military commanders could understand, and to translate their reports and requests and explanations into language that Lincoln understood. That was what Lincoln meant when he called Halleck a “first-rate clerk.” Of course he had wanted him to be more than a clerk, and that is why Lincoln finally appointed Grant as general in chief and booted Halleck upstairs into the new office of “chief of staff,” where his clerkly qualities were needed.

Symonds: Lincoln was clearly relieved to turn over military operations to Grant in 1864, but did he also fear Grant as a potential political rival?

McPherson: He had been concerned about Grant as a potential political rival, until Grant let it be known throughout intermediaries that he unequivocally and absolutely had no political ambitions in 1864 and strongly supported Lincoln’s reelection. After that, Lincoln had no more concerns.

Symonds: Now that you will be the owner of two busts of Lincoln by Augustus St. Gaudens, along with your many other prizes, isn’t your house getting pretty full?

McPherson: There is still room in the house, but since my grandchildren are interested in Mr. Lincoln in bronze, I may deposit this bust in their house, where I can visit it whenever I want (they live ten miles away).

Editor’s Note: We are giving away one signed copy of Lincoln and His Admirals. The first person to email blog.us(at)oup.com will win.

It is my pleasure to announce that Craig L. Symonds is one of two winners of the 2009 Lincoln Prize for his book Lincoln and His Admirals!  Congratulations are also in order to James M. McPherson who won for Tried By War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief.  Each received a generous cash award and a bronze cast of Augustus St. Gaudens‘ portrait sculpture of Abraham Lincoln (I saw the bronze cast, it is truly beautiful.)  Below is an original post from Symonds about Lincoln and Obama.  Be sure to read our other bicentennial Lincoln posts here.

The media took much notice of the fact that Barack Obama was intent on duplicating much of Abraham Lincoln’s behavior as President-Elect. Doris Kearns Goodwin’s superb book Team of Rivals is said to be one of the books Obama has read with great interest, and he has chosen a “Team of Rivals” for his Cabinet. Similarly, President Obama took a train from Philadelphia to Washington, duplicating part of Lincoln’s journey from Springfield to the capital in 1861. For this, Obama might have consulted Harold Holzer’s new book on Lincoln, President Elect. Others have noted that Obama has inherited what is arguably the worst national and international circumstance for a new president since Lincoln, with the possible exception of Franklin Roosevelt. How will he apply Lincoln’s style or outlook to the problems he has inherited?

My own recent study of Lincoln has confirmed in my mind several aspects of Lincoln’s leadership style that already seem to be part of Obama’s world view, which should stand him in good stead as he considers how to manage (or end) two wars, and stabilize and then revitalize a collapsing economy.

The most obvious of these is a serenity fueled by patience and a habit of thoughtfulness. Though we tend to assume that strong presidents are proactive, controlling a situation rather than responding to it after it has happened, the fact is that Lincoln was almost never proactive. Instead he took the time to consult with his advisers often making them present their positions in short memos. He also took up the pen himself, writing down options in order to clarify them, then writing down possible solutions. Many of these “Memos to Self” were never made public and were found among his papers only after his death. He also waited to see what public opinion would tolerate, reading many newspapers, especially opposition newspapers, before making a decision. He was so patient that it sometimes looked as if the momentum of history was about to take the decision out of his hands before he acted.

Indeed, his very first crisis—what to do about Fort Sumter—found him waiting until it was almost too late. It is even possible to argue that he waited until is WAS too late. On his very first day in office he received a report from the beleaguered commander of Fort Sumter, Major Robert Anderson, that the garrison was running out of food and that it must evacuate soon if not re-supplied. Moreover, Anderson reported that it would take twenty thousand men to re-supply him. Well, here was a conundrum. Lincoln had just promised in his inaugural address to “hold, occupy and possess” all Federal property in the South—a clear and specific reference to Fort Sumter, but there were not twenty thousand soldiers in all of the U.S. military in 1861. Like no-drama Obama, Lincoln did not panic. He met with his Cabinet and his military advisers, listened to all their input, sent scouts to Charleston to assess the situation there, and waited. By the time he sent an expedition there, Anderson’s supplies were all but exhausted. Lincoln’s patience was not a product of passivity, however. His decision to notify South Carolina State authorities that the expedition was en route deftly threw the ball into the South’s court and, when Fort Sumter was attacked, allowed the North to emerge as the aggrieved party.

Similarly, during the Trent affair, Lincoln was a master of forbearance. After Captain Charles Wilkes captured two Confederate ambassadors on the high seas, Britain responded with an ultimatum that gave the U.S. just seven days to release them and offer a public apology or face war. Again Lincoln waited, and his patience let the emotions of the moment ease allowing a solution that was both diplomatically acceptable, and politically benign. Had he responded to the ultimatum with the kind of fist-shaking defiance that would have been popular at home, it might indeed have led to war and the U.S. might be two countries today.

Even in dealing with emancipation, the most difficult problem of his administration—indeed, of American history—Lincoln showed remarkable composure which in the end led to a permanent solution. Some thought he was too patient. The abolitionists, including free blacks like Frederick Douglass, could not understand why he moved so slowly. But Lincoln knew what he was about. He moved as fast, and as efficiently, as public opinion, and the war news, would allow him to do.

Barack Obama, who has already demonstrated his patience and his pragmatism in his “no-drama” campaign, seems now to be echoing not only Lincoln’s cabinet choices and his travel route, but also his characteristic style. This bodes well for the future.

I have two copies of my 2008 calendar to give away to two different blog visitors (plus a surprise gift!). Here's the rules: Post a comment on the following topic and I'll draw from the names of people who comment on or before January 31st for the prize. Then once I've contacted the winner you'll be sent the prize (please don't leave your address in the blog comment section but rather leave a website or blog address/email where I can get this from you privately)!

Here's the topic:

"Green Illustration & Design" (what are you doing to make your illustrations and office more environmentally friendly? Any links to good office crafts out or recycled goodies? And if you're not an illustrator or designer what are you doing to make your home more eco-friendly?)

Raleigh’s Page

Author: Alan Armstrong

Illustrator: Tim Jessell

Publisher: Random House Books for Young Readers

Raleigh’s Page is the riveting story of Andrew, a young boy sent to be a page to his father’s old friend Walter Raleigh. Yeah that Walter Raleigh - throw his pearl studded cloak on a puddle for Queen Elizabeth of England to walk on Walter Raleigh. Pretty cool, no? I was always fascinated by that story but didn't really know much about him other than the usual middle school page in a history book.

Andrew goes to live in Raleigh's estate along with two other boys who are already serving as pages to him. He is fascinated by all the newness but misses his family. One of the boys is cruel but the other is a good friend to him. Andrew, the farmer's son makes a great friend in the French gardener and becomes his apprentice. Together they learn of strange plants from other lands and prepare for the New World.

Raleigh himself is an interesting character in this book. I was fascinated by his excitement and verve. Walter Raleigh is a high energy, intelligent and purposeful man in this book. His way of teaching the children in his care is also fascinating. He plans secret trials that not only test the boy's writing, business acumen and other abilities but he tests the strength of their character. Interesting.

Andrew, being a solid farm boy with good values and a strong character shines in this story. He's a normal boy with hopes and dreams and fears, yet he consistently rises to any occasion, whether it be spying, carrying secret documents or venturing out to the New World. He meets the mysterious Dr. Dee, the Queen's own astrologer among other characters that populate this book.

Ah yes, Raleigh is planning a big trip to the colony of Virginia - the first expedition to Roanoke and Andrew is determined to go along. The story gets even more interesting once Raleigh's ship actually gets to Virginia. Alan Armstrong writes a great tale full of intrigue, adventure, compassion and understanding.

Raleigh's Page is one heck of a great read. The marvelous illustrations by Tim Jessell give depth to the story and a flavor for the time period in which it is set. One of my favorite illustrations is one of Walter Raleigh almost bursting with excitement.

Book Description from the publisher:
Andrew has grown up near the Plymouth docks hearing the sailors talk about America. Knowing that Andrew's heart is set on going to the new world, his father sends him up to London to serve as page in the house of Walter Raleigh. In Queen Elizabeth's court, Raleigh's the strongest voice in favor of fighting with Spain for a position in the New World, and everyone knows that it's just a matter of time before Her Majesty agrees to an expedition. Can Andrew prove himself fit to go on an expedition to the New World?

Meticulously researched and brilliantly crafted, combining fictional characters with historical, Andrew's tale offers up a vivid look at the cloak and dagger politics of the time and a genuine feel for what it must have been like for the first Europeans to set foot on the beautiful, bountiful, savage shores of America.

About the Author
Alan Armstrong's first book, Whittington, was awarded the Newbery Honor in 2006. He lives in Massachusetts with his wife, Martha, a painter.