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Elvin Lim is Assistant Professor of Government at Wesleyan University and author of The Anti-intellectual Presidency, which draws on interviews with more than 40 presidential speechwriters to investigate this relentless qualitative decline, over the course of 200 years, in our presidents’ ability to communicate with the public. He also blogs at www.elvinlim.com. In the article below he looks at Howard Dean. See Lim’s previous OUPblogs here.

The year is 1964, the high watermark of Liberalism. Lyndon Johnson takes 61.1 percent of the popular vote in his election contest against Barry Goldwater, an electoral feat that was bigger than Franklin Roosevelt’s 60.8 percent in 1936 and one that has not been surpassed in the years since. The Democratic tsunami sweeps down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol, where Democrats would out-number Republicans two to one in the 89th Congress, and in the Senate they take 68 seats – the biggest supermajority held by any party to this day. The era of Liberalism had entered its Golden Age.

Unified by the inspiring memory of John Kennedy, Democrats were able to enact health-care legislation that even Franklin Roosevelt, the father of modern Liberalism did not have the stomach to attempt as part of his New Deal. It would be Lyndon Johnson, not Harry Truman, not FDR, and not his counsin, Theodore Roosevelt (running as the Progressive Party candidate in 1912) who would enact the single biggest health-care legislation in US history, offering single-payer, comprehensive health-care benefits to seniors over the age of 65 (Medicare) and an option for states to finance the health-care of the indigent (Medicaid) in the Social Security Act of 1965.

We remember the New Deal, and perhaps the Fair Deal, but it is the Great Society that is the apotheosis of 20th century Liberalism. And if 1965 is Liberalism’s high water-mark, then those who would stymie health-care reform today because of the lack of a robust (or indeed, any) public option have gravely gotten their decades mixed up.

There was a time when Liberals did not have to call themselves “Progressives.” That was four decades ago, when Lyndon Johnson attacked Barry Goldwater for wanting to roll back social security and openly campaigned for a further expansion of the welfare state. Times have changed. Today’s Progressives must cagily wrap their Liberal agenda with talk of choice, competition, and bending cost curves. And if the era of Liberalism as FDR and Johnson knew it is over, The Age of Reagan lingers on in the Tea Party Movement. Despite his aspiration to build an even Greater Society than Johnson, Barack Obama’s electoral mandate is 18 percent short of what Johnson possessed in 1965; the Democratic majority is the House is much smaller; and, despite the new cloture rules post-1975 in the Senate which has reduced the fraction of votes needed to end debate from 2/3 to 3/5, Joe Lieberman et al remind us every day that the Senate is anything but filibuster-proof.

To Governor Dean and his compatriots, it is 2009, not 1965.

Elvin Lim is Assistant Professor of Government at Wesleyan University and author of The Anti-intellectual Presidency, which draws on interviews with more than 40 presidential speechwriters to investigate this relentless qualitative decline, over the course of 200 years, in our presidents’ ability to communicate with the public. He also blogs at www.elvinlim.com. In the article below he looks at reconciliation. See his previous OUPblogs here.

There is a lot of hushed talk about using the Reconciliation procedure to pass health-care reform in the Congress these days, so Americans need to know something about this obscure parliamentary procedure, and what is at stake.

Reconciliation is an optional, deficit-reducing procedure that was created in the 1974 Congressional Budget Act. The Reconciliation process is a two-stage process. First, Reconciliation directives must be included in the annual Budget Resolution (as they were in the 2010 Budget Resolution passed on April 29). These directives instruct the relevant Congressional committees to develop (in this case, health-care) legislation by a specific date (in this case, October 15) to meet certain spending or revenue targets. The instructed committees then send their legislative recommendations to their respective Budget Committees, who then package all recommendations into one omnibus Reconciliation bill. Enter Stage 2, when this bill is then considered on the floor of both chambers of Congress under expedited procedures; of greatest political note is the 20-hour limit on debate on any Reconciliation measure, which effectively strips the minority party of the filibustering option in the Senate. That means the Democrats can pass health-care reform with a simple majority.

But there is an attendant cost to the majority party for using Reconciliation. The Byrd rule, passed in 1985, sets out the rules for what Reconciliation can and cannot be used for. In particular, it specifies that Senators will be allowed to raise a point of order against “extraneous” provisions in a Reconciliation bill which, among other things, “would increase the deficit for a fiscal year beyond those covered by the reconciliation measure.” Critically, cloture must be invoked to overcome a point of order. So the filibuster power is back.

Here’s the bottom line. Since the Budget Act states that the Reconciliation measure covers the next ten years, the Byrd Rule had the effect of allowing a point of order to be raised against any spending increase (or tax cut) that does not contain a ten-year sunset provision. That’s why the Bush tax cuts, passed via the Reconciliation route in 2001, 2003, and 2005, had sunset provisions written into them. If Democrats use Reconciliation, they will get a health-care bill, but it will expire.

Now let’s talk politics. There’s a debate within the debate that only seasoned politicos know about. Since the actual benefits of Reconciliation are mixed - a health-care bill can be passed with a simple majority in the Senate but it must have a sunset provision - the real power of Reconciliation is not in its actual usage, but in the mere threat of its usage.

The benefits of issuing the threat of going the Reconciliation route are akin to the threat of a presidential veto. The threat of a presidential veto sets the boundaries of permissible legislative action; it lets Congress know what is out-of-the-question and therefore powerfully guides legislative outcomes in the direction of the president’s preferences. By letting it be known that they will resort to Reconciliation if they had to, Democrats in Congress are incentivizing Republicans to be part of the making of a bi-partisan bill rather than be shut out of a purely partisan one. In making the threat, Democrats are specifying the costs of Republican non-compliance to the tune of: “if we let you stay in the kitchen, at least you can determine some of the ingredients in the cake. Make us shut you out and you won’t have even the slightest say.”

Like the presidential veto, the power of Reconciliation is maximal at the level of a threat. For between the time a threat is issued and the time when a bill is passed (via Reconciliation or not), there is a powerful incentive for Republican Senators to come back to the bargaining table because there is the distinct possibility that they could be shut out. Reconciliation is the Democratic antidote to the Republican Party becoming the “Party of ‘No’” For if Republicans keep saying “No,” then they box themselves into the plea of Nolo Contendere.

That is why different spokespersons for the Democratic Party are keeping the Republicans guessing and making sporadic and cryptic references to the Reconciliation possibility. And Republicans are trying to minimize the power of the threat by characterizing it as a no-go “nuclear option.” Unfortunately for Republicans, theirs is an empty threat because there is no Mutually Assured Destruction in this asymmetric power situation, and it is both a legal and political fact that, as the White House says, the Reconciliation option “is out there.” It is a win-win situation for Democrats to issue the threat, for if Republicans are unmoved by the threat, Democrats could materialize the threat and get what they wanted having known that an effort at bipartisanship had failed anyway.

What is missed in the debate out there now is that the effect of Reconciliation is already underway, for its power lies in its threat.

Edward A. Zelinsky is the Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. He is the author of The Origins of the Ownership Society: How The Defined Contribution Paradigm Changed America. In this article, Zelinsky argues that President-elect Barack Obama should hope that Democrats do not obtain the sixty U.S. Senate seats which would enable them to shut down a Republican filibuster. A filibuster-proof Senate will make it more difficult for Obama to hold together the disparate coalition which elected him.

One important question remains from the 2008 election: Will Democrats occupy the sixty U.S. Senate seats which would enable them to shut down a Republican filibuster? Two Republican incumbents, Coleman of Minnesota and Stevens of Alaska, are still locked in tight battles for re-election. One Republican incumbent, Chambliss of Georgia, must win a run-off election in December to retain his Senate seat. Independent Senator Lieberman of Connecticut has reportedly indicated that he will join the Republican caucus if the Democrats punish him for his vocal support of Senator McCain’s presidential candidacy. Democrats now occupy fifty-seven Senate seats including Lieberman and independent Sanders of Vermont, who caucuses with the Democrats. If the closely-contested seats in Alaska, Minnesota and Georgia all go Democratic and if Lieberman stays in the Democratic caucus, the Senate Democrats would have the magic sixty votes to squelch a Republican filibuster.

One person in particular should hope that the Senate Democrats don’t reach this talismanic number: President-elect Barack Obama. A filibuster-proof Senate will make it more difficult for him to hold together the disparate coalition which elected him.

As James Madison famously noted, a majority in a large democracy invariably consists of different interests (what Madison called “factions”) assembled into an inherently unstable, tension-filled coalition. President Bush’s Republican majority included social conservatives, economic conservatives, libertarians, neo-conservatives – all of whom had some things which united them but many things which did not.

Similarly, the Obama coalition includes unions, minorities, social liberals, and economic moderates who agree on some things but not on others. Holding that majority together will require careful balancing. If the Democrats hold a sixty seat majority in the Senate, elements of the Obama coalition will credibly demand measures which other parts of that coalition oppose. In contrast, if the Republicans can sustain a filibuster, Mr. Obama can better finesse the tensions in his coalition by pinning failure on the G.O.P.

Consider, for example, the union demand that federal labor laws be changed to require recognition of unions without secret votes by the affected workers. No less a Democratic icon than Senator George McGovern has made clear that many Democrats oppose this proposal. If the Senate Democrats have the sixty votes which can stop the Republicans from filibustering this measure, the unions will demand that the new president deliver for them on this issue.

This, however, will alienate those parts of the Obama coalition who were persuaded that he is an economic moderate. If, in contrast, the Republicans can sustain a Senate filibuster, the President-elect has the perfect out: He can support the unions’ demand while counting on the Republicans to successfully filibuster and thereby save him from his commitment.

Or consider gay marriage. The voting results from California reflect the tension on this issue within the Obama coalition. As Californians voted overwhelmingly for Mr. Obama, they also voted against same-sex marriage. This result indicates the fissure between, on the one hand, those social liberals who supported Mr. Obama and favor gay marriage and, on the other, minorities and economic moderates who also supported Mr. Obama but oppose gay marriage. After their California defeat, gay marriage advocates may seek federal action to advance their cause. Mr. Obama can finesse this issue which divides his majority if he can point to the filibustering Senate Republicans as the barrier to federal recognition of gay marriage.

It may be true that to the victor belongs the spoils. But, under our system, to the victor also belongs the problem of holding together his winning coalition. And if the victor is too victorious, that problem can be severe.

The President-elect cannot openly say that he is better off with a Senate which the Republicans can successfully filibuster. But the political reality is that he is. Mr. Obama can control his unruly coalition more easily with external opposition in the form of a Republican minority capable of sustaining a Senate filibuster. President-elect Obama should want the Senate Republicans wounded, not down for the count.