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The set of (relatively) liberal recent pronouncements from the United States Supreme Court features a judgment in Texas Department of Housing v Inclusive Communities Project(2015). The Court, by a slender majority, held that the Fair Housing Act 1968 prohibited not just disparate treatment (direct discrimination in UK law), but also disparate impact (indirect discrimination), based on race.
During the decades of debates over marriage equality in the United States, opponents centered much of their advocacy on the purported need to maintain marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution in order to promote the well-being of children. It was therefore fascinating to see the well-being of children play a crucial role in the US Supreme Court’s ruling on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans in Obergefell v. Hodges, albeit not in the way opponents of marriage equality hoped.
Like many, I’m still digesting the Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision—not just its text, but its personal and social significance. When I wrote Debating Same-Sex Marriage with Maggie Gallagher (Oxford University Press, 2012), only a handful of states permitted same-sex couples to marry. In the three years since, that handful grew to dozens; last Friday’s decision grows it to all 50. One striking thing about the decision itself is the importance of the definitional question: What is marriage?
One striking thing about the decision itself is the importance of the definitional question: What is marriage?
If the state prohibits same-sex couples from marrying, does it thereby interfere with their liberty, as the majority argues, or does it simply decline to grant them certain benefits? If the latter, is it treating them unequally—and thus violating the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment—by privileging certain citizens without sufficient reason for the distinction? The answer depends on what marriage is. If marriage by definition requires (at least) one man and one woman, then same-sex “marriage” is impossible by definition, and one does not treat people unfairly by denying them something impossible.
Customary international law arises from the practices of nations followed out of a sense of legal obligation. Although long an important source of international law, there continues to be debate and uncertainty about customary international law’s status in the US legal system.
Maryland State Comptroller of the Treasury v. Brian Wynne requires the US Supreme Court to decide whether the US Constitution compels a state to grant an income tax credit to its residents for the out-of-state income taxes such residents pay on out-of-state income.
Brian and Karen Wynne live in Howard County, Maryland. As Maryland residents, the Wynnes pay state and county income taxes on their worldwide income. The Maryland income tax statute provides that Maryland residents who pay income taxes to states in which they do not live may credit against their Maryland state income tax liability the taxes paid to those states of nonresidence. However, the Maryland tax law grants no equivalent credit under the county income tax for out-of-state taxes owed by Maryland residents on income earned outside of Maryland.
When the Wynnes complained about the absence of a credit against their Howard County income tax for the out-of-state income taxes the Wynnes paid, Maryland’s Court of Appeals agreed. Maryland’s highest court held that such credits are required by the nondiscrimination principle of the US Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause. The absence of a credit against the county income tax induces Maryland residents like the Wynnes to invest and work in-state rather than out-of-state. This incentive, the Maryland court held, may impermissibly “affect the interstate market for capital and business investment.”
For two reasons, the US Supreme Court should reverse. First, Wynne highlights the fundamental incoherence of the dormant Commerce Clause test of tax nondiscrimination: any tax provision can be transformed into an economically equivalent direct expenditure. No principled line can be drawn between those tax provisions which are deemed to discriminate against interstate commerce and those which do not. All taxes and government programs can incent residents to invest at home rather than invest out-of-state. It is arbitrary to label only some taxes and public programs as discriminating against interstate commerce.
Suppose, for example, that Howard County seeks to improve its public schools, its police services or its roads. No court or commentator suggests that this kind of routine public improvement violates the dormant Commerce Clause principle of nondiscrimination. However, such direct public expenditures, if successful, have precisely the effect on residents and interstate commerce for which the Court of Appeals condemned the Maryland county income tax as discriminating against interstate commerce: Better public services also “may affect the interstate market for capital and business investment” by encouraging current residents and businesses to stay and by attracting new residents and businesses to come.
There is no principled basis for labeling as discriminatory under the dormant Commerce Clause equivalent tax policies because they affect “the interstate market” of households and businesses. Direct government outlays have the same effects as do taxes on the choice between in-state and out-of-state activity. If taxes discriminate against interstate commerce because they encourage in-state enterprise, so do direct government expenditures which make the state more attractive and thereby stimulate in-state activity.
Snow Clouds Over a Snowy Field, Patuxent Hills, Maryland. Photo by Karol Olson. CC BY 2.0 via olorak Flickr.
Second, the political process concerns advanced both by the Wynne dissenters in Maryland’s Court of Appeals and by the US Solicitor General are persuasive. Mr. and Mrs. Wynne are Maryland residents who, as voters, have a voice in Maryland’s political process. This contrasts with nonresidents and so-called “statutory residents,” individuals who are deemed for state income tax purposes to be residents of a second state in which they do not vote. As nonvoters, nonresidents and statutory residents lack political voice when they are taxed by states in which they do not vote.
Nonresidents and statutory residents require protection under the dormant Commerce Clause since politicians find it irresistible to export tax obligations onto nonvoters. The Wynnes, on the other hand, are residents of a single state and vote for those who impose Maryland’s state and local taxes on them.
In reversing Wynne, the Supreme Court should decide narrowly. The Wynnes, as residents of a single state, should not receive constitutional protection for their claim to a county income tax credit for the out-of-state taxes the Wynnes pay. However, the Court’s decision should not foreclose the Court from ruling, down the road, that credits are required to prevent the double income taxation of individuals who, for income tax purposes, are residents of two or more states. Such dual residents lack the vote in one of the states taxing them and thus require constitutional succor which the Wynnes do not.
Dissenting in Cory v. White, Justice Powell (joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens) argued “that multiple taxation on the basis of domicile” is unconstitutional. Since the Wynnes are taxed by only one state, the Supreme Court need not now confront this issue again. However, the Court should decide Wynne in a fashion which allows the Court to revisit this question in the future by holding that credits are constitutionally required to prevent the double taxation of dual residents.
Few recent decisions of the US Supreme Court have engendered as much controversy as Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. In that case, the Court decided that a closely-held corporation’s employer-sponsored medical plan need not provide contraception if the shareholders of such corporation object to contraception on religious grounds.
Responding to the resulting controversy, Senator Patty Murray, along with many of her Democratic colleagues, has proposed legislation to overturn Hobby Lobby. Senators Kelly Ayotte and Deb Fischer, along with many of their Republican colleagues, have introduced legislation confirming Hobby Lobby. In the current political environment, there is little chance of either bill becoming law any time soon.
However, there is a response to Hobby Lobby which would address the concerns of both contraception advocates and of religious objectors to contraception. In particular, any employer which objects to providing birth control should instead be required to fund for its employees independently-administered health savings accounts (HSAs) or health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs). An HSA or HRA permits the covered employee to spend employer-provided, pre-tax health care dollars on any medical service the employee chooses, from birth control to an MRI, without implicating the employer in the employee’s spending decision.
The HSA/HRA alternative respects the religious rights of sponsoring employers. With conventional insurance or self-insured health plans, the sponsoring employer’s plan provides a menu of choices which frames the employees’ decisions. In contrast, the HSA/HRA approach permits employees to spend health care dollars on whatever medical services employees select including services to which the employer objects – without the employer’s plan framing the employees’ choices. HSAs and HRAs are thus like cash wages which, when spent by the employee, do not entail participation by the employer.
Justice Alito’s Hobby Lobby opinion identifies two other possible ways to provide contraception services without violating the rights of objecting employers. First, HHS might extend to closely-held for-profit firms the regulatory accommodation now limited to religious nonprofit entities other than churches. Under this accommodation, insurers or third-party administrators provide employees with contraception at no cost to the religious employer. Alternatively, the federal government might itself make birth control available to women who lack contraception coverage from their employer-sponsored health plans.
Commentators have expressed reservations about both these approaches. Some women’s health groups argue that a federal program will stigmatize the women who receive their contraception from such a program. Moreover, the problems of the Department of Veterans Affairs suggest the need for skepticism about the federal government as a provider of medical services. A number of religious groups contend that the current regulatory accommodation for religious employers does not go far enough and still makes employers participate in the provision of birth control to which they object.
In light of these concerns, HSAs and HRAs are compelling alternatives. HSAs and HRAs are analogous to cash wages which the employee spends as he chooses. Such accounts can assure women of the ability to obtain contraception which they seek with employer-provided, pre-tax health care dollars without burdening the religious beliefs of employers who object to involvement with contraception.
Suppose, for example, that Hobby Lobby is required to establish for each of its employees an HSA or HRA administered by the company’s bank. A Hobby Lobby employee could submit receipts to the bank for any type of medical care the employee selects. The employee would subsequently receive from the bank a reimbursement check for this care from his or her HSA/HRA account. Alternatively, HSA/HRA debit cards have become popular devices. These cards allow a covered employee to swipe when receiving health care services with the card.
These accounts could be used by each employee to defray any medical expense the employee elects including, but not limited to, the kinds of contraception to which the employer objects. However, the employer would not be complicit in the employee’s medical choices just as the employee does not participate in an employee’s decision to spend her wages on something with which the employer disagrees.
The HSA/HRA approach potentially has political legs. HHS (along with the Departments of the Treasury and Labor) could adopt regulations implementing this approach. Conservatives like HSAs and HRAs since these accounts implement a consumer-driven approach to health care. Liberals want to assure employees of contraception even if employers object to contraception. The HSA/HRA response to Hobby Lobby thus has bi-partisan appeal and is a compelling compromise as a matter of law and public policy.
Edward A. Zelinsky is the Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the 